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ANNE O. KRUEGER*
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence about interactions
between trade policy instruments and domestic factor markets and their role in
affecting the labour intensity of industry mix and choice of techniques in a number
of developing countries. Using estimates of the elasticities of substitution in the
manufacturing sector ,statistical evidence is presented to determine the impact of
trade policy on industrial employment. There is a strong presumption that the
phenomena under review were mainly responsible for low rates of employment
growth in the industrial sector in those countries where distortions were sizeable.
The National Bureau of Economic Research's project on Alternative Trade
Strategies and Employment was designed to investigate the relationship between
choice of trade strategy, domestic factor markets, and the rate of growth of non-
agricultural employment. This paper summarizessome of the main results.
Three alternative, mutually inconsistent, hypotheses were all possible:
(1) The amount of employment generated is relatively independent of the trade
strategy;
(2) hnport substitution generates significantly less employment growth than
does an export-oriented strategy/ and
(3) An export-promotion strategy may in fact conflict with efforts to expand
employment.
The first possibility - that trade strategy does not affect employment very
much - might arise for several reasons. First, one might be able to establish the
*
The au thor is Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
(USA). This paper summarizes some of the results of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) research project on Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment. A
full account of the research may be found in [5; 6; 7] .
1By export-oriented trade strategy is meant a set of policies which are designed to induce
exports, without regard to the specific product exported. In general, such a strategy is infeasible
if high levels of protection are accorded to other industries in the economy.
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direction of difference in labour intensity of poduction, but find that the difference,
if any, was so small that, within the conceivable range of relative growth rates, the
effects on employment would be second-order small. Secondly, one might find that
a particular policy (such as subsidization of capital-goods imports), not really
essential to the trade strategy adopted, had adverseeffects on employment and that a
different set of policies could implement the same trade strategy without the adverse
employment effects. Finally, it might be that the influences determining the
composition of exporting and import-substitution industries are independent of
factor intensities, and that different relative rates of growth of the two groups of
industries would not necessarilyaffect the rate of growth of employment.
The second possibility - that import-substitution industries require consider-
ably less labour per unit of capital and per unit of value added - is the forecast that
would arise from straightforward interpretation of the two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin
model of trade. Developing countries would presumably have their comparative
advantage, at least in the early stages of growth, in exporting labour-intensive
commodities and importing goods with relatively higher capital (and perhaps skilled
labour) requirements.
Finally, there is the already-mentioned possibility that export promotion
and employment growth are conflicting objectives. Several possible reasons have
been suggested. One view was that developed countries have erected, or would erect
if export-promotion strategies were adopted, such high barriers to import oflabour-
intensive goods that the developing countries can only compete in capital-intensive
exports. Another argument was of the casual empiricism suggestingthat the exports
of some developing countries - notably Colombia and Brazil - were capital-inten-
sive. Yet others claimed that most of the exports of manufactured goods originating
in developing countries are produced by branches and subsidiaries of multinational
corporations which, it was alleged, use capital-intensive technology of the home
country .
If export-promoting growth was capital-intensive, there remained a question
as to why it was so; the answer might lie partly in the mix of export incentives
granted in the developing country and in domestic policies affecting the relative
profitability of different industries. If, instead, developing countries' potential
manufactured export were capital-intensive, not because of distortions but because
of factors associated with comparative advantage, it was important to ascertain it and
to obtain some idea of the empirical magnitude and importance of the phenomenon.
In part, this is because the reasons for concem differ from country to
country. They include (i) increasing relatively high-productivity employment
opportunities outside the agricultural sector to absorb the low-income agricultural
population; (ii) increasing employment IiIpportunitiesin the urban sector to reduce
the number of the urban unemployed; and (iii) providingemployment opportunities
for the poor in order to increase their real income and improve the distribution of
income.
The first concern has been a focal point of development economics ever since.
W. Arthur Lewis's classic article, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies
of Labour". Lewis characterized the development process as being that of creating
higher- product non -agricultural employment opportunities at a sufficiently rapid
rate first to increase the share of the labour force in non-agricultural activities and
then to decreaseabsolutely the number of persons engagedin agriculture.
Although Lewis's analysis led to the view that there was "disguised unemploy-
ment" in agriculture, positing a zero marginal product of labour in agriculture was
not really central to his analysis. Rather, the central insight was that additional non-
agricultural employment opportunities would raise real income by transferring
persons from low-wage, low-product employment to higher-wage, higher-product
employment. Seen in this light, Lewis's concem with the employment problem was
that of increasing the productivity associated with the employment activities of the
population.
Although subsequent developments have indicated forcefully that there are
many opportunities for increasing real output and income within agriculture, to this
day a central reason for concem with employment creation is the belief that raising
the average and marginal product of the entire labour force is crucial to the growth
process. Emphasis is placed upon non-agricultural employment opportunities,
.largely because it is believed that, given pressures of population growth on the land,
non-agricultural employment opportunities will (in conjunction with output
increases in the agricultural sector) provide the best means for increasing real income,
and thereby raisingthe rate of growth of per capita incomes.2
Concern with absorbing the urban unemployed focusesmore specifically upon
the social hardships associated with unemployment in the cities. It is well known
that urban populations have increased very rapidly in most of the developing
countries in the past several decades. In many countries, that growth has been
accompanied by an increasing number of the urban unemployed, while the rate of
increase in employment opportunities, at least in the "formal" sector of the
THE EMPLOYMENT"PROBLEM" IN THE LDCs
Everyone agrees that employment is a "problem" and that increased
employment opportunities are an "objective" in most LDCs. There is less agreement,
however, as to what the nature and cause of the "problem" are and as to the reason
why employment creation is desirable.
2There are two sets of models that posit an upper bound on the number of "productive"
jobs that can be created. The first is the "technological" explanation, first set forth by Eckaus
[2]. According to that view, the labour-capital endowment in the industrial sector of developing
countries exceeds the maximum technologically feasible ratio. The alternative is the "two-gap"
model, in which a foreign exchange or savings limit prevents further expansion in real output.
The model is associated with Hollis B. Chenery and Michael Bruno [1] .
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economy, has been sluggish. Creation of urban employment has been regarded as a
desirable policy goal because of the belief that this would reduce urban unemploy-
ment and its accompanying hardships.3
The third concern, providing employment opportunities to the poor, has some-
what different origins. Unlike Lewis's focus, in which employment creation is
associated with economic growth and risingper capita real incomes, the objective has
been redistribution rather than growth. This focus explicitly raises the question of
the extent to which "employment creation" is compatible with economic growth; in
other words, whether providing more jobs, instead, may not lower the rate of
economic growth.
Conflict would arise, of course, only if job creation meant reducing real
output, or if creating more jobs with given investible resources implied achieving a
lower increment in real output rather than creating fewer jobs with those same
resources. In so far as policies can be identified which would permit a faster rate of
increase in employment (especially of the unskilled) with efficient allocation of
resources, everyone would agree on the preferability of those job opportunities to
ones that reduced real income and output. It is therefore safe to conclude that if a
trade strategy that is optimal from the viewpoint of resource allocation also creates
(in the sense to be defined below) as many new job opportunities as (or more such
opportunities the than) a non-optimal one, the question of "conflict" between real
income and employment does not arise.
In the NBER project, focus on the link between trade strategies and employ-
ment was centred upon the non-agricultural, and often the industrial, sector. This
was done partly because it was believed that rapid rates of non-agricultural labour
force growth made this the pressing policy issue, and partly because it was believed
that the key links between choice of trade strategy and employment arise in the
industrial sector of developing countries. Suffice it here to point out that this focus
is consistent with many viewsof rural labour markets, including the Lewisviewpoint,
and also with the notion that rapidly growingpopulations must, if per capita incomes
are to rise, find productive non-agricultural employment.
There is yet another issue, which has to do with what is meant by "job
creation," and what the determinants of (non-agricultural) employment and its
growth rate are. If labour markets in developing countries functioned well in the
neoclassical sense, the "employment problem" would centre entirely upon the set of
concerns related to productivity and shifting the demand for labour upward.
Outward shifts in the demand for labour in excess of the rate of outward shift of
supply (due to population growth and consequent changesin the labour force) would
result in rising real wages, since, by hypothesis, in a well-functioning market all
would be employed at a similar wage.4 Failure to shift the demand curve for labour
outward rapidly enough would result, not in unemployment, but rather in a decline
in the real wage.s This provides the motive for concern with shifting the demand for
labour outward, which has been the interpretation placed on "employment" in the
NBER project.
However, there are important questions about the determinants of the labour
supply to non-rural areas,6 the degree to which labour markets are fragmented or
integrated,7 and non -market influences upon the level and structure of wages. Open
unemployment in urban areas has emerged as ~ major policy problem in some
countries and consideration of the "employment p{oblem" requires a satisfactory
analysis of why unemployment exists, who the unemployed are, and what their
resources are.
For purposes of analyzing the relation between trade strategies and employ-
ment, the presence of open urban unemployment must give the analyst a pause. In
particular, under some kinds of market imperfections, outward shifts in the demand
for labour can generate responses that largely, if not entirely, offset any increase in
employment that might otherwise result. This can be seen with two simple
examples. If labour markets are sufficiently fragmented, outward shifts in demand
for labour in some parts of the market may not result in additional employment but,
instead, raise wages for those already employed in the sector. Likewise, if unions are
sufficiently powerful so that all outward shifts in the demand for labour in unionized
sectors are fully offset by increased real wages,policies designedto create jobs in the
high-productivity unionized sectors are destined to frustration.
Thus, in interpreting data on labour coefficients and average wage rates, the
analyst must ascertain whether labour coefficients reflect distortions rather than the
inherent "labour intensities" that would be observed in a competitive labour market.
Observed trade patterns may be influenced by the existing pattern of wagesand may
not reflect comparative advantage that would exist under an efficient allocation of
resources. Finally, identifying the impact that alternative trade strategies might have
upon the demand for labour cannot be equated with its impact on employment when
some sorts of distortions are present.
ALTERNATIVETRADE STRATEGIES
A necessary condition for optimal resource allocation for any country
is that the domestic marginal rate of transformation (DMRT) among produced
3Depending upon the structure of the urban labour market, creating more jobs may in fact
increase unemployment. See Harris and Todaro [31.
4For an analysis of the role of skills and determinants of the wage structure, see below.
s It is even possible that in a neoclassical labour market an upward shift in the demand for
labour could result in decreased employment (if the labour supply curve were backward-
bending).
6See Sen [10] for a fuller discussion of the ways in which the labour supply to the urban
sector might be perfectly elastic.
7The less the degree to which changes in one part of a market affect other parts, the more
fragmented that market is said to be. If labour is perfectly immobile between two areas, their
markets are entirely fragmented.
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commodities should equal the international marginal rate of transformation (IMRT)
among them. For a small country unable to influence its international terms of
trade, international prices (f.o.b. for export and c.i.f. for import)8 can be used to re-
flect IMRTs. In the absence of distortions in the domestic market, domestic prices
can be used to reflect DMRTs.9
It is readily shown that any departure from this optimality rule results in a
production cost to the economy: when the DMRT between a pair of traded
commodities is unequal to the IMRT, switching production toward the item with the
relatively lower domestic cost enables a country to receive .more of the other
commodity through trade than it can obtain through domestic production.
The optimality criterion leads naturally to a definition of bias of alternative
trade regimes: bias defmes the direction. and the degree to which, on an average,
domestic incentives diverge from those that would prevail under free trade. The
notion is most readily formalized in the two-commodity case. Let p's represent
international prices, and q's d~mestic prices, with subscripts m and x denoting the
import-competing and export goods respectively. Then, B, the bias of the regime,
can be defined simply as:
encourage some exportable industries (at least more than others) and export-promo-
tion countries normally protect some import-substitution industries, one rarely
encounters a bias of around unity in trade regimes with some high levels of protec-
tion for import -competing industries and some large incentives for export promo-
tion. Regimes tend either to be generally biased towards import substitution or
towards export promotion.
COUNTRIESCOVERED IN THE PROJECT
Table 1 indicates the countries covered by the project and, in addition, gives
some data which provide insight into some aspects of the trade regime in those
countries. Estimates are given of the mean effective rate of protection (ERP) for all
manufacturing activities for sale in the home market in the year indicated. In the
third column, the abbreviations givea rough idea of the trade strategy in force at the
time of the ERP estimates. Several of the countries altered their trade strategies, so







If the world and domestic prices of exportables coincide, while the domestic price of
import-competing goods is above the world price, B > I and the regime is biased
towards import substitution. Conversely, if imports are subsidized, then B < I and
the bias of the regime is toward exports. Naturally, the more B divergesfrom unity
in a particular direction, the more biased the regimeis.
One might anticipate that countries would stay fairly close to uniform
incentives. In practice, while even the most import-substitution -oriented countries
Observed labour coefficients are the joint outcome of underlying comparative
advantage, the incentives accorded by the trade regime, and conditions in domestic
factor markets. Table 2 givesestimates of labour inputs per unit of DVA (domestic
value added) in various exportable trade categories expressed as a ratio of the labour
per unit of OVA in Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) import-competing indus-
tries.lO For Brazil, for example, the averagelabour input per unit of OVA in HOS
exportables was 2.07 times as much as the labour input per unit of OVA in import-
competing activities.
The second and the third columns give comparable estimates, again as a ratio
to the figure for import-competing industries, for non-primary-commodity-based
HOS exportables and (primary-commodity based) PCB-HOSexportables separately.
A final column givesestimates, for those countries for which they are available, of
the labour coefficients fOrNRB exportables.11
8There is a range of commodities whose allocation to export or import categories is
ambiguous, and the precept that is so simple in theory is not that readily implemented in
practice. See [5, Chap. 1] for a discussion of the allocation of commodities and industries to
trade categories on the basis of the conceptual framwork of Chapter 4, in [7].
91n the presence of such distortions, shadow prices can be used to estimate DMRTs.
Estimation itself is difficult empirically, although conceptually it is straightforward. See T. N.
Srinivasan and Jagdish Bhagwati [11] for a discussion.
10HOS industries are manufacturing industries; the classification into exportable and
import- competing was made by each country author based on criteria spelled out in [5, Chap. 1] .
11The Ivorian estimates provide an indication of some of the complexities of attempting
to associate particular groups of industries with alternative trade strategies. In that country,
natural-resource-based (NRB) exports have predominated. For those commodities, "artisanal"
labour is employed, and expansion of NRB exports (and NRB import-competing production)
would entail increased demand for artisanal labour (some of which comes from immigration
from neighbouring countries). Artisanal labour is naturally unskilled, and most NRB export
activities are highly labour-intensive. Contrasting the labour coefficients for NRB exports with
that for total labour in all HOS import-competing activities shows that NRB exports require
more than nine times as much labour per unit of domestic value added. For a full analysis, see
[7,Chap.5] and [5,Chap.6].
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exports; when pulp and paper was treated as a PCB-HOSindustry, Chilean and other
HOS manufactures required 1.5 times as much labour as Chilean import-competing
HOS activities. The differences between labour coefficients for total HOS exports
and HOS import-competing industries are sizable for many of the countries,
exceeding a factor of two for Brazil, Indonesia, and Thailand, and also exceeding that
number in Tunisia when PCB-based manufacturing is excluded.
It is of interest that in all countries, except Chile, total HOS exports had labour
coefficients per DVA that exceeded those in the corresponding import-competing















Notes: EP = export promotion.
IS = import substitution.
MIS = moderate import substitution.
Argentina: Julio Nogues, Banco Central de Argentina,
Brazil: Jose L. Carvalho, Fundacao Getulio Vargas - EPGE,
Chile: Vittorio Corbo, Universidad de Chile and Patricio Meller, CIEPLAN,
Colombia: Francisco E. Thoumi, Inter-American Development Bank,
Hong Kong: Yun Wing Sung, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Indonesia: Mark M. Pitt, University of Minnesota,
Ivory Coast: Terry Monson, Michigan Technological University,
Pakistan: Stephen Guisinger, University of Texas at Dallas,
South Korea: Wontack Hong, Seoul University,
Thailand: Narongchai Akrasanee, Asian and Pacific Development Institute,
Tunisia: Mustapha K. Nabli, Campus Universitaire, Tunis,
Uruguay: Alberto Bension and Jorge Caumont, Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo.
Except for Argentina and Hong Kong, the resultsJor indivi~ual ~ountries maybe found in the
individual country chapters in [5]. Argentinian results are In Julio Nogues [9] and Hong Kong
in Yung Wing Sung [12].
Notes: Ivory Coast: Modern sector ratios are relative to modern sector employment in modern
sector HOS importables; total employment (including artisans) is relative
to employment in all HOS importables.
South Korea: Data are per unit of output.
Tunisia: Crude and refined oil are excluded from the individual exportable
estimates; manufactured consumer goods were used for protected imports;
import-competing sectors exclude those with negative IVA.
Data are for total workers per DVA, [5, Chap. 11, Table 12] .Uruguay:
Table I
Indicators of TradeStrategy: VariousCountries
Trade AverageERP Range
Period
Strategy for Manufacturing of ERPs
(2) (3) (4) (5)
1969 IS 111 - 13 to 900
1958 IS 106 17 to 502
1963 IS 184 60 to 687
1967 MIS 63 4 to 252
1967 IS 175 - 23 to 1140
1969 MIS 19 - 8 to 140
1972 EP 1 small
1971 MIS 119 - 19 to 5400
1973 EP 41 - 25 to 278
1963-64 IS 356 - 6 to 595
1970-71 IS 200 36 to 595
1968 EP -1 - 15 to 82
1973 MIS 27 - 43 to 236
1972 IS 250 1 to 737
1965 IS 384 17 to 1014
Table 2
Direct Labour Coefficients per Unit of DVA
(ratio of coefficients in designated




(with Reference Years) Manufactures PCB Exports
not PCB Manufactures Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Argentina (1963) n.a. n.a. 1.24 n.a.
(1973) n.a. n.a. 1.30 n.a.
Brazil (1970) n.a. n.a. 2.07 2.02
Chile (1966--68) 1.50 n.a. 0.80 n.a.
Colombia (1973) n.a. n.a. 1.88 n.a.
Indonesia (1971) 1.58 n.a. 2.09 n.a.
Ivory Coast (1972)
(a) modem sector n.a. n.a. 1.35 2.28
(b) total n.a. n.a. 1.16 9.04
Pakistan (1969-70) . 1.23 1.69 1.42 n.a.
South Korea (1968) n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a.
Thailand (1973) 3.20 1.58 2.07 n.a.
Tunisia (1971) 2.08 0.79 1.28 3.31
Uruguay (1968) n.a. n.a. 1.53 1.45
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It is perhaps somewhat more surprising that in those cases for which data were
available, NRB exports turned out to be more labour-using per unit of DVA than
were HOS import-competing industries.12 In most cases, this result is simply a
reflection of the fact that most NRB exports originate from the agriculture sector, in
which output per worker is very low and techniques of production are very labour-
intensive. There are important and unresolved questions about the functioning of
rural labour markets. The predominance of NRB, labour-intensive, exports in the
total export bundle is an important reason why labour coefficients should be
estimated separately for NRB and HOS goods.
The reader will have observed that data for South Korea were not included in
Table 2. The reason for this omission is that estimates of the factor content of South
Korea's trade have been made in terms of labour and capital in puts per unit of out-
put, rather than per unit of DVA. Hong's estimates for South Korea are for total
trade, including both NRB and other trade in one category, and are therefore not
comparable to the other figures. Table 3 therefore reproduces the estimates by West-
phal and Kim [13] of labour-capital ratios for manufacturing sectors only. In the
light of South Korea's lack of raw materials, it is likely that there are few manufactur-
ing sectors deriving their comparative advantage from raw material availability, so
that the figures can be taken as representative of HOScategories.
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ratio in exporting had increased to 3.55, while that in import-competing industries
was 2.33: all manufacturing except that destined for the domestic market had
increased its labour-capital ratio over the course of the shift to export promotion. 13
Data for Hong Kong are also of interest, and are presented in Table 4. Hong
Kong has virtually no raw materials, so that all exports can be regarded as HOS
goods. In Hong Kong, as in South Korea, the domestic value-added-to-output ratio
was substantially higher in import-competing industries than in export industries. In
the South Korean case, this is in part a reflection of the fact that the authorities were
Table 4
Factor Proportion in Hong Kong's Trade
(per million Hong Kong dollars




















































Source: [12] .As can be seen, South Korea's manufactured exports were, on an average,less
labour-intensive than her manufactures sold in the domestic market in 1960,
although they were about one-third more labour-intensive than import-competing
manufacturing. That year marked the start of the South Korean export promotion
drive. By 1963, exports had increased their labour-intensity relative to import-
competing goods, and also relative to domestic output. By 1968 the labour-capital
l3In correspondence, Hong offered an index of labour intensity of South Korean
domestic output and exportables with 1960 = 100. According to these data, labour intensity
behaved as follows:
1966 1968 1970 1973 1975- - - - -
Domestic Output 1.000 .553 .610 .500 .382 .333
Exportables 1.026 .884 .873 .670 .460 .263
This pattern is generally consistent with the Westphal-Kim findings. By 1975, subsidies to using
capital were an important component of the export incentive system. See Hong's discussion in
[5] .
1963
12If the Tunisian figure is recomputed to include oil among NRB exports, the Tunisian
NRB exports become an exception to the above statement.
Manufacturing Sector 1960 1963 1966 1968
Domestic Output 2.97 2.89 2.67 2.64
Exportables 2.72 3.02 3.24 3.55
Import-Competing Production 2.09 1.93 1.98 2.33
Source: [13].
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very liberal in pennitting exporters to import needed raw materials, but much more
restrictive in their treatment of producers of goods destined for sale on the home
market. In part, however, it may also reflect that both South Korea and Hong Kong
have tended to find production for export most profitable in lines in which they
could import raw materials without heavy transport costs. For activities where
high transport costs precluded importing raw materials and intennediate goods,
reliance upon domestic sources probably led to a competitive disadvantage in their
trade.
Overall, the descriptive statistics of Tables 2, 3 and 4 support the proposition
that HOS exportables, at least in the countries covered in the project, tend to be
more labour-using than HOS import-competing production. This conclusion holds
regardlessof the impact of policy measures and factor market distortions upon factor
proportions and the commodity composition of trade. To be sure, these statistics
provide only a glimpse into the possible orders of magnitude of the potential impact
on employment of a shift in trade strategy. They are nonetheless suggestivethat a
shift towards an outward oriented trade strategy would generally not be consistent
with the goal of increasingemployment opportunities.14
The country authors' estimates of the separate coefficients for skilled,
unskilled and managerial labour inputs are reported in Table 5. There appear to be
large and systematic differences between skill coefficients for HOS exportable and
HOS import-competing industries. They are more pronounced than differences in
overall labour coefficients.
The definition of skills changed from country to country, depending on data
availability. Since coefficients generally pertained to urban sector production in
HOS exporting and import-competing industries, it is a reasonable conjecture that, in
most cases, the tenn "unskilled" labour refers to individuals in the least-educated or
least trained category eligible for employment in any modem sector activity. It is
probable that some literacy was required.
. From Table5, the picture that emergesis that unskilledlabourcoefficientsin
HOS import-competing industries are even smaller relative to HOS exporting
industries than are total labour coefficients. In each case for which a breakdown is
available, the unskilled labour coefficient ratio for exportables exceeds that for total
labour. Likewise, in all cases the skilled labour coefficient in import-competing
industries exceeds that in exportable industries.I5
Thus, based on the evidence from the countries covered in the project, it
appears that not only are-HOS exportables generally more labour-using than HOS
Table 5
Ratio of Direct Coefficients in HOS Exportable to











Colombia: Unskilled workers are blue-collar workers.
Indonesia: "Unskilled" is sum of "male operative" and "female operative" man-days.
Ivory Coast: Modern sector HOS coefficients from [5, Chap. 6, Table 11]. Data refer to modern
sector HOS exportables and import-competing industries.
Skilled workers are "white-collar" workers.Uruguay:
14The pattern of factor demand implied by alternative trade strategies appears in general
to be little affected whether direct or direct-plus-home-goods-indirect-coefficients are used.
15Data from Hong Kong show a similar picture. The ratio of professional labour in
import-competing to exportable industries was 1.77. Nogues estimated a higher skill coefficient
of Argentine import-competing industries by 27 percent when a skill classification was used.
import-competing goods, but their input of unskilled labour is greater than that of
import-competing industries by an even wider margin, while import-competing
industries place a greater demand on the skilled labour forces in those countries.
There are apriori grounds for expecting differences in factor intensity both for
exports by destination and for imports by source. This expectation was in general
borne out by the results of the individual country authors. Table 6 provides the
basic data. In some instances, notably in those of Indonesia and Hong Kong, such a
large fraction of exports is destined for developed countries that it is difficult to
attach significance to the separate coefficients. In other cases, however, the trade
with other developing countries is sizable, and differences in factor proportions
considerable. For Chile, for example, about half of all HOSexports are destined to
other Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) countries. Chile's exports to
developed countries have a labour coefficient of 61, contrasted with 29 for exports
to the LAFTA region. Uruguay has sizable exports to LAFTA and, again, these
exports appear to be far less labour-intensive than exports to developed countries.
For Brazil, too, LAFTA exports are less labour-intensive than other exports. For the
Ivory Coast and Pakistan, there are also pronounced differences on the import-
competing side: for those two countries, production competing with imports from
Unskilled Skilled ManagerialPeriod
Labour Labour Labour
1973 n.a. 1.268 n.a.
1959 n.a. 0.954 n.a.
1971 n.a. 0.978 n.a.
1966-68 n.a. 0.842 n.a.
1973 2.174 0.519 1.231
1971 2.273 0.810 1.100
1972 1.510 0.960 0.835
1972 1.582 0.810 .n.a.
1968 1.404 0.939 n.a.
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other LDCs was far more labour intensive than was production competing with
imports originating from developed countries.
The orders of magnitude of difference in labour intensity according to export
destination are in some cases as great as the differences between overall labour
coefficients for HOS exportables and import-competing production. For Chile, for
example, reducing one unit of DVA of exportable production for developed
countries and replacing it with one unit of DVA of import-competing production
would entail a net "loss" of 18 jobs, or a reduction of 28 percent in employment.
By contrast, contraction of a unit of DVA of HOS exportable production for other
LDCs (almost entirely LAFTA) and replacement with a unit of DVA of domestic
import-competing production would result in a change from 29 jobs to 43 jobs -
an increase of almost 50 percent in employment. To be sure, the coefficients are not
necessarily perfect indicators of what would happen with an alteration in trade
strategy, but the orders of magnitude are sufficient to suggest that it matters not
only which sectors - NRB or HOS - trade originates in, but also which countries are
the trading partners. For Chile, an export-promotion strategy based upon the
LAFTA market would probably result in a shift towards lesslabour- usingindustries,
while an export promotion strategy based upon trade with the developed countries













Exchange rate overvaluation, coupled with the reluctance of policy makers to
impose duties on imports of capital goods, has contributed to low capital costs under
import-substitution regimes. There are five countries where authors had data to
estimate the order of magnitude involved - Argentina, Brazil (in the 1950s), Chile,
Pakistan, and Tunisia. In all cases, the authors' estimates of the order of magnitude
of the subsidy from the trade regime implicit in the pricing of capital goods was in
the range of 30-40 percent, by no means a negligibleamount.
Under export promotion, the picture has been different. There, the currency
has been fairly realistically valued, so that little opportunity for undervaluation of
capital goods has arisen. Rather, the experience has tended to be that domestic
incentives, such as low-interest loans, are accorded to exporting industries.
In contrast to trade regimes, credit rationing, or at least provision of some
low -interest loans, was a feature of almost all countries, both export-promoting and
import substitution.16 One or more forms of subsidy to the use of capital or
imported capital equipment were found in all cases analyzed. The implicit subsidy
involved appears to have been substantial, exceeding the estimated magnitude of cost
reduction associated with currency overvaluation in some cases. Even in South
Korea, interest subsidies appear to have become a distortionary element of some
magnitude, especially in the late 1970s, after the period covered by Hong.
Two additional conclusions emerged. First, in many instances reductions in
the cost of using capital equipment were granted for firms carrying out objectives
associated with the trade regime. Thus, the Ivory Coast's "priority industry"
status, which provided loans at preferential rates and tax exemptions, was a means
whereby the authorities could induce production of the types of commodities they







Data are from [5, Chap. 2, Table 14 J and represent total labour require-
ments per DVA. The numbers for developed countries are an unweighted
average of EEC and U.S. and Canada coefficients while the LDC numbers
refer to LAFTA trade.
DC figure is an unweighted average of "United State" and "other
developed countries".
Total man-days from [5, Chap. 5, Table 15].
Data (expressed in man-hours) taken from Table II and represent total
labour requirements per DVA. HOS import-competing industries refer
to imports requiring protection. No breakdown of HOS exportable trade
between DCs and LDCs was made due to the unimportance of the latter.
Excludes PCB exports [5, Chap. 7,Table 12 J'
Data supplied by Akrasanee for HOS Import-Competing goods, exclusive
of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, gives 21 for DCs and Total.
16Hong Kong is an exception. It is arguable whether Brazil's BNDE loans constitute
credit rationing. And the evidence is simply not available for Chile or Colombia.
Table 6
Direct Labour Coefficients per D VA
by Direction of Trade
HOS Exportables HOS Import Competing
Period
DC LDC Total DC LDC Total
1973 164 147 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1959 115 141 ll5 n.a. n.a. 128
1970 89 79 87 n.a. n.a. 71 I
I,1972 109 78 87 n.a. n.a. 71
1966-68 61 29 34 43 43 43
1970 28 21 24 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1973 32 24 29 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1973 24 21 24 18 15 17
1971 2176 2149 2175 994 1117 1038
1972 n.a. n.a. 2488 1520 1743 1652
1%9-70 90 88 188 70 120 71
1973 22 20 22 11 22 11
1968 441 239 366 n.a. n.a. 238
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to have been destined largely for some of the sectors associated with her export-
promotion drive. These, and other, examples provide yet another strong indication
that one cannot divorce analysis of the trade regime and its effects from considera-
tion of conditions in domestic markets.
Secondly, low-interest loans and currency overvaluation are in many ways
substitutes in so far as they affect the cost of using imported capital equipment. In
some cases, such as that of Pakistan, they interact to provide very large reductions in
cost. In principle, however, either an overvalued exchange rate or availability of
credit at below-market borrowing rates can provide strong incentives for use of
capital-intensive techniques.
Tuming to labour market distortions, a first, and perhaps most important,
conclusion to be drawn is how little is known about conditions in labour markets in
the LDCs. In part, this is because the data requirements for a satisfactory analysis of
these phenomena are inherently demanding, and defmitive data sets are hard to come
by. Nonetheless, it is clear that further research on determinants of wage structure
is called for, and that the results would substantially enhance our understanding of a
number of important phenomena in developing countries. A second conclusion,
necessarily considerably more impressionistic than the first, is that the extent and
magnitude of labour market distortions are considerably smaller than were
anticipated and that mispricing of capital goods and capital services appears to be
proportionately larger than that of labour services.
The most frequently-encountered intervention in labour markets is the
imposition of social insurance payments and other chargesupon the employment of
labour. Large firms in the formal sector are obliged to pay these chargeswhile those
in the informal sector are able to avoid them. That pattem appears to be the case in
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Ivory Coast (in combination with minimum wage
legislation), and perhaps in Thailand. The same type of differential in unskilled
wages appears in Tunisia between government enterprises and small-scaleemployers,
but the causal mechanism is less clear.
At least until the early 1970s, the impact of these regulations appears to have
been restricted to the fomal sector and unskilled labour. If one is focusing upon the
impact of alternative trade strategies upon employment, however, it is precisely the
unskilled workers, and the ability of firms and industries using them intensively to
compete on international markets, that must be the focal point of analysis. It is
perhaps noteworthy that both Brazil and South Korea, during their periods of rapid
export growth, had few interventions with wage determination and, in the Brazilian
case, those that there were appear to have diminished considerably in importance
over the period. Likewise, the countries where there are sizable differences in labour
coefficients according to trade categories - notably Indonesia, Pakistan, and, to a
lesser extent, Thailand - are countries where there has not been, at least during the
period covered by the analysis, any significant degree of intervention in wage deter-
mination for unskilled workers.
CONCLUSION: TOTAL SIZE OF FACTOR COST DISTORTIONS
With the caveat that they are only of orders of magnitude, estimates of the
degree to which wage-rental rations diverged from those that would have prevailed
under well- functioning factor markets can be assembled from the country studies.
Table 7 provides the data. The numbers would have greater comparability if
one could provide estimates of the variance of these cost-increasing and cost-
reducing distortions, as well as their mean, but it is not possible to do so. The
comparability across countries is, therefore, extremely limited. For example, Nogues
estimated that the reduction in costs of capital due to the trade regimein Argentina
when all capital goods were imported was on the order of 40 percent - remarkably
close to the estimates from Chile, Pakistan and Tunisia (as well as Brazil in her
import-substitution period). However, for Argentine firms there was an offset in
that domestically-produced capital goods cost more than imported ones would have
at equilibrium. Thus, the average 8 percent figure calculated by Nogues represents
what the net impact would be on a manufacturing firm employing imported and
domestic capital goods in the proportions used by the sector as a whole. In reality,
there were undoubtedly firms. importing almost all their capital equipment, and
others relying almost entirely on domestic capital goods. Whether Argentina's
8 percent averagereduction in capital cost due to the trade regime represents more or
less of ,a distortion given the presence of the domestic capital-goods-producing
import-substitution industries than the 38 percent reduction in Pakistan, where
almost all capital goods were imported (and where, therefore, the reduction was
probably relatively uniform and across-the-board) is an open question.
Before examining the data in Table 7, one other comment is in order. That is,
a distortion affects the wage-rental ratio throughout the economy. If, for example,
one sector has a tax imposed upon the utilization of a particular factor of
production, the retum to that factor of production and all others will be affected,
both in the tax-impacted sector and in the rest of the economy. It is well known
that there are conditions under which raising the price of, e.g. labour, to a particular
sector can lower the real wage to workers in both sectors. In the empirical estimates
that follow, no account is taken of this phenomenon, and it is assumed that the
wage-rental ratio in the sectors not subject to any distortions is unaffected by their
presence elsewhere in the economy. In a sense, the estimates of the magnitude of
distortions presented here are really an estimate of the differential in relative factor
prices between sectors subject to distortions and sectors not subject to distortions.
Turning then to the data in Table 7, it is apparent that labour market factors,
the trade regime,credit rationing, and tax systems, all contributed to raisingthe wage-
rental ratio for firms subject to them. There is no single pattern of relative
importance among these factors, however. Pakistan, which appears to have the
highest degree of implicit subsidization to the use of capital-intensive techniques, has








Credit rationing at subsidized interest rates is estimated by Hong and Guisinger
to have constituted a major source of underpricing of capital services. Finally, social
insurance taxes have driven a wedge, again of about 20-30 percent, in the price of
labour between firms and sectors subject to the taxes and other activities within the
economy.
Each of these sources of pricing disparity between firms and sectors by itself
could significantly have affected incentives, but together the effects may have been
fairly powerful. All of them work in the same direction, to induce lower capital
costs, and higher labour costs than would be chosen at appropriate shadow prices.
Distortions of the order of magnitude reported by the country authors must surely
have reduced whatever comparative advantage these countries might otherwise have
had in labour-intensive exports.
This raises a fundamental empirical question, about which there is little
information to date. That is: how large are the differences in "natural" wage-rental
ratios that would be observed under an efficient allocation of world resources? If, in
fact, Pakistan's optimal wage-rental ratio is one- fiftieth of that of her major trading
partners, then the fact that trade and domestic policies distorted that ratio by a
factor of four need not have significantly adversely affected her potential pattern
of commodity trade. If, on the other hand, the optimal wage-rental ratio in Pakistan
were one- fifth of that of her major trading partners, distortions of the order of
magnitude estimated by Guisinger [5, chap. 7] would have had a severe impact on
the potential for gains from trade. Moreover,if there were "neighbouring" countries
in the chain of comparative advantage with fewer distortions in factor markets than
those in Pakistan, one can again imagine that distortions within Pakistan could have
adversely affected the scope for profitable (and economic) expansion of exports.
Percentage Distortions in Labour and







Capital Costs due to
Note: No quantitative estimates are available for Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand or Uruguay.
aEstimates based on differentials given in [5, Chap. 6, Table 15] and reproduced in
Section 7.2.6 of [7] .
(or, more accurately, had) a relatively free labour market. By contrast, Tunisia, like
the Ivory Coast, appears to have had cost differentials of virtually all types. Yet the
rank order of the estimated magnitude of distortion seems to be independent of the
number of different types of distortions identified. Thus, Nogues was able to
quantify labour market interventions of several types as well as trade regime and
credit rationing influences upon capital costs. Yet, his estimates for Argentina fall
far below Nabli's Tunisian estimates where the same pattern of pervasive distortion
seems to have existed.
What seems clear, even from these impressionistic data, is that the exporting
countries - Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, the Ivory Coast
- had relatively lower levels offactor market distortions than did the import-substi-
tution countries, with the possible exception of Argentina. Even there, the
Argentine data represent perhaps more of an average among highly-subsidized and
unsubsidized firms.
A second conclusion, probably not unrelated to the first, is that currency
overvaluation and favourable treatment of capital-goods imports were potent sources
of lowering the costs of capital utilization for firms eligible to import. For
Argentina, Chile, Pakistan and Tunisia, as well as for Brazil in her import-substitu-
tion days, this source of underpricing of capital goods wasjudged to be important.
RELATNE IMPORTANCEOF TRADE STRATEGY AND
FACTOR MARKETDISTORTIONS
Finally, one can estimate the combined potential impact of choice of trade
strategy, within-strategy inefficiencies, and factor market distortions on the increase
in the demand for labour in the project countries. Such estimates are, of course,
based on a number of assumptions, not to mention imprecise data.
The estimates are contained in Table 8. There, the observed labour coefficients
in HOS exportables and import-competing industries (with the labour coefficient
in import-competing industries set equal to 100) are given in Column (2).
Columns (3) and (4) then indicate the percentage increase in the labour coefficient
that might have been expected if there were no domestic factor market interventions,
and no incentives associated with the trade strategy that lower the cost of using
capital-intensive techniques of production. Column (5) then gives the estimate of
the extent to which the labour coefficient might increase by altering the commodity
Argentina 1973 15 8 9 n.a. 17 38
Brazil 1968 27 0 4 n.a. 4 31
Chile 1966-68 n.a. 37 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ivory Coast 1971 23 0 3a 12a 15 45
Pakistan 1961-64 0 38 53 10 76 316
South Korea 1969 0 0 8 2 10 11
Tunisia 1972 20 30 6 n.a. 36 87
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composition of output under the trade strategy indicated. Finally, Column (6) gives
the coefficient that would be observed if all sources of distortion were removed.
As can be seen, the estimated increments in labour coefficients are quite
sizable. For example, if the underlying assumptions and data are correct, Tunisia
might have generated about twice as many employment opportunities as, in fact,
were generated under the import-substitution strategy. By and large, the estimates
suggest that there is more scope for improving the efficiency of resource allocation
among import- competing industries than there is among HOSexportable industries.
Only for Chile and Colombia do the estimates indicate opportunities for greater
proportional potential increases in exportables. In both those instances, this reflects
the fact that exportables under the import-substitution strategy in effect at the time
of the estimates probably constituted a response to import-substitution incentives.
In the Chilean case, especially, it was the incentives under import-substitution
to export out of import-substitution output to LAFTA that account for the sizable
potential for increasing employment in exportables. This could have been realized
simply by shifting towards greater emphasis on exports destined for developed
countries.
Table 9 summarizes the findings from Table 8, and then in addition provides an
estimate of the proportionate differences in labour coefficients under alternative
trade strategies. For example, the estimates suggest that the Ivory Coast could have
realized an increase in employment within HOS exportable industries of25 percent,
and within import-competing industries' of about 40 percent. In addition, shifting a
thousand FCFA of domestic value added from HOS import-competing production to
exportable production (within the modern sector) would have permitted a
21-percent increase in the demand for labour per unit of shift.
These numbers by no means indicate the extent of possibilities for a shift in
the demand for labour. In particular, if substitution of labour for capital were
encouraged by the dismantling of incentives for employing capital, there could
presumably be additional investment in some tradable activities; the increment in the
demand for labour that might arise from that source is not considered here, partly
because the estimates are already conjectural enough, and partly because the same
"released capital" effect would occur regardless of which of the three sources of
increased demand for labour evaluated in Table 9 in fact took place. For the latter
reason, there is some basis for believing that the magnitude of the numbers in Table 9
already reflects the relative potential for increasing the demand for labour within
existing trade strategies and also by altering trade strategies.
Comparisons across countries, based on the data in Table 9, should be made
with care. In particular, the low estimated potential for South Korea is a misleading
figure, given knowledge of the rapid expansion of manufacturing employment that
occurred following that country's switch in trade strategy. Indeed, the evidence
suggests that the South Korean emphasis on export promotion resulted in a fairly
efficient pattern of production within import-competing as well as exportable
industries, which had already been realigned by 1968. Thus, comparison of the
Notes: 1. Ivorian estimates are for modern sectors only.
2. Corbo-Meller estimates for capital costs refer to direct plus home goods indirect
[7,Table 8-8]. '
3. An estimated labour share of 0.3 was used in relying on data in [7, Table 8-9J.
4. For Chile, Within-strategy inefficiency within exports taken to be LDC exports.
Table 8
Sources of Potential Increase in Labour Coefficients
Observed
Increase (percent) if there is
Countries Potential
(with Reference
Direct No domestic No Trade No within- Coeffi-
Years) Labour factor market Strategy strategy cient
Coefficient intervention Distortion Inefficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. HOSImport-Competing Industries
Argentina 1973 100 18 -8 0 110
Brazil 1970 100 15 n.a. n.a. 115
Chile 1966-68 100 n.a. 7 n.a. 107
Colombia 1970 100 n.a. n.a. 10 110
Indonesia 1971 100 n.a. n.a. 66 166
Ivory Coast 1972 100 25 0 12 140
Pakistan 1969-70 100 271 0 n.a. 271
South Korea 1968 100 8 0 0 108
Tunisia 1971 100 17 38 58 244
B. HOSExportable Industries
Argentina 1973 130 18 -8 0 143
Brazil 1970 207 15 n.a. n.a. 238
Chile 1966-68 80 n.a. 7 68 144
Colombia 1970 170 n.a. n.a. 24 210
Indonesia 1971 209 n.a. n.a. 0 209
Ivory Coast 1972 135 25 0 0 169
Pakistan 1969-70 142 271 0 n.a. 384
South Korea 1968 100 8 0 0 108
Tunisia 1971 128 17 38 0 198
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CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps the most striking findings emerging from the Trade Strategies and
Employment Project were that, on the one hand, despite factor market conditions,
developing countries' manufactured exports tend to exhibit the factor intensity
consistent with their endowment, and that, on the other hand, the scope for further
increasing the demand for labour through both trade policies and realignment of
domestic factor market incentives is sizable.
Thus, in answer to the questions initially raised in the project, there does not
appear to be any conflict between objectives associated with more rational resource
allocation and increasing the demand for labour, especially unskilled labour. Indeed,
the degree to which the project countries' exportables were intensive in the use of
unskilled labour was one of the important conclusions to emerge from the country
studies.
An equally striking finding was the extent to which our knowledge and under-
standing of factor markets in developing countries are imperfect. Analysis of the
interaction between trade strategies and domestic factor markets was generally
constrained more by a lack of data and analyses of domestic factor market
conditions than by data and analyses of trade strategies.
The project has raised as many questions as it has answered, but an analysisof
most of those questions will require prior intensive examination and understanding
of the functioning of domestic factor markets. The evidence on the size of the
divergence in capital-labour costs, between formal and informal sectors of the
economy, is striking. Although the estimates given above provide some basis for
assessing the effects of such differences, there is a great deal of work remaining to
be done in understanding factor market interventions and their effects. The orders
of magnitude are so large that it is at least plausible that low observed elasticities of
employment with respect to industrial output may be explicable in terms of factor
market interventions. Regardless of whether those distortions are partly or almost
entirely to blame for failure of employment opportunities to grow, finding ways to
remove incentives for using capital-intensive techniques is surely one component of
any effort to increase real incomes and employment opportunities.
The evidence from the country studies and from the project as a whole
strongly suggests that there are potential gains to be had in resource allocation and
employment from shifting to an outward-oriented trade strategy. Moreover, the size
of the potential gain very much depends on the degree to which factor markets
function appropriately. While alteration of the trade strategy itself may remove
one source of distortion in costs of using capital-intensive techniques, it is clear that
credit rationing, tax structures, and labour legislation also play important roles.
In many of the project countries, provision of appropriate factor market
incentives to producers could have resulted in significantly increased demand for
unskilled labour, given the existing trade strategy. Likewise, alteration of the trade
Brazilian potential for increasing the demand for labour through shifting trade
strategies (which was presumably largely realized during the late 1960s and early
1970s) with the South Korean potential is unwarranted.
Of greater interest is the extent to which inferences can be drawn from the
comparative magnitudes within countries. For Tunisia, the greatest potential source
of increase in the demand for labour appears to arise from rationalization of the
import-competing sectors of the economy. For Pakistan, removing incentives for
employing overly capital-intensive techniques would appear to offer even greater
promise of shifting the demand for labour upward than does a shift in trade strategy.
To be sure, Pakistan could, by shifting trade strategies and removing incentives to
employ capital-intensive techniques, realize an even greater upward shift in the
demand for labour. That is, if the labour-value added ratio in Pakistani HOS export-
ing industries rose by 171 percent in response to the abandonment to use capital-
intensive tecluJiques and Pakistan simultaneously shifted resource towards export-
ables, the scope for increased employment would be 1.41 times 1.71, or 2.41, as
domestic factors of production allocated at the new factor proportions in export-
abIes would result in a labour-value added ratio 2.41 times as high as the preexisting
labour-value added ratio inHOS import-competing industries. For all the countries,
except possibly South Korea in 1968, there was clearly sizable room for increasing
the demand for labour consistent with improved resource allocation and generally




Potential Sources of IncreasedDemand for Labour
Increased in Labour
Coefficient at Shift
Countries Year Constant Value in
Added Strategy
E IC
(Percent of ObservedLabour Coefficient)
Argentina 1973 10 10 30
Brazil 1970 15 15 107
Chile 1966-68 80 7 34
Colombia 1970 24 10 91
Indonesia 1971 n.a. 66 26
Ivory Coast 1972 25 40 21
Pakistan 1969-70 171 171 41
South Korea 1968 8 8 0
Tunisia 1971 55 144 23
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strategy could have resulted in sizable increases in the demand for unskilled labour,
even in the presence of inappropriate relative prices for use of factors of production.
Obviously, however, the greatest potential for employment gain is in those situations
where the shift in policy realignsincentives in both the domestic factor market and
the trade regime. The extent to which there may have been interaction between
inward-oriented trade strategies and factor-market distortions, both leading to high
capital-output ratios and low rates of increase in the demand for labour, is striking.
Moreover, the income-distribution implications of the findingsseem to accord
fairly well with the proposition that inward-oriented trade strategies and measures
which increased incentives for using capital-intensive techniques probably
contributed to a less equal income distribution than might otherwise have been
observed. The fact that HOS exportable industries tend to be relatively intensive in
the use of unskilled industrial labour suggests that additional employment in those
industries would increase the rate at which the urban sector could absorb new
entrants to the labour force. To be sure, in so far as removal of labour-market legis-
lation might reduce the real incomes of industrial workers, there would tend to be
a partial offset; however, in most of the countries covered in the project, employed
industrial workers were a small elite receiving relatively high earnings at the expense
of fewer employment opportunities in the industrial sector and lower earnings for
those unable to find employment within it.
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